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Given the recent and highly publicized
scandals involving psychology researchers
who cheated, the proliferation of articles
on related topics is unsurprising. As an
example, Simons et al. (2011) pointed
out subtle ways in which researchers can
increase their false positive rate above the
nominal level of p < 0.05. From my per-
spective, a major limitation of the liter-
ature on cheating has been a failure to
distinguish between two kinds of cheat-
ing (bias might be a kinder word), that I
term descriptive and inferential cheating.
I intend to demonstrate that inferential
cheating is not as destructive as descriptive
cheating.
So what is descriptive and inferen-
tial cheating? Descriptive cheating involves
the false reporting of descriptive data,
such as sample means, proportions, stan-
dard deviations, and so on. The harm of
descriptive cheating is obvious, has been
demonstrated by previous scandals, and
needs no further elaboration here. In con-
trast, when a researcher cheats inferen-
tially, the descriptive data are true but the
reported p-values (and associated t-tests,
F-tests, and so on) are not. My conclu-
sion that inferential cheating causes only
limited harm is based on demonstrations
that the null hypothesis significance testing
procedure (NHSTP) is invalid. My conclu-
sion is that although providing false infor-
mation that matters a lot, such as wrong
descriptive statistics, can do much harm,
providing false information that matters
hardly at all, such as false p values, does not
do much harm.
So what is wrong with the NHSTP?
The basic idea is that if we are to reject
the null hypothesis, it should be shown to
have a low probability of being true, given
the finding. But a p-value does not pro-
vide this; rather, a p-value only shows that
a finding is rare given the null hypothe-
sis (Nickerson, 2000). As Kass and Raftery
(1995) pointed out, knowing that a find-
ing is rare given a hypothesis is not useful
unless one knows how rare the finding
is given a competing hypothesis. Also,
Trafimow (2003) demonstrated that (1)
the null hypothesis can have a very high
probability (including a probability of 1)
of being true even when p < 0.05, (2)
p-values generally are inaccurate estima-
tors of probabilities of null hypotheses,
and (3) the conditions needed to make
p-values valid indicators of probabilities
of null hypotheses preclude the researcher
from gaining much information from the
NHSTP. Furthermore, Trafimow and Rice
(2009) demonstrated that the correla-
tion between p values and probabilities
of null hypotheses is low to begin with,
and decreases to triviality when dichoto-
mous “accept” or “reject” decisions are
made based on cutoff numbers such as
0.05 or 0.01.
The famous theorem by Bayes provides
examples whereby the null hypothesis will
be rejected even when it has a strong likeli-
hood of being true. Suppose that the prior
probability of the null hypothesis is 0.95,
the probability of the finding given the
null hypothesis is the traditional value of
0.05 (so the null hypothesis is rejected),
and the prior probability of the finding
given that the null hypothesis is not true
is 0.06. In that case, the posterior prob-
ability of the rejected null hypothesis is
(0.95)(0.05)
(0.95)(0.05)+ (0.06)(1−0.95) = 0.94.
In the foregoing example, I tacitly
allowed the null hypothesis to represent
a range of values. Worse yet, however,
in most empirical psychology articles, the
null hypothesis refers to a single value
(e.g., that the difference between two con-
ditions is zero). But when the null hypoth-
esis refers to a specific value, it is a practical
certainty that the value is not exactly true.
With an infinite number of possible val-
ues, the probability that the single value
specified by the null hypothesis is exactly
true approaches zero (e.g., Meehl, 1967;
Loftus, 1996; Trafimow, 2006), and so it
should be rejected.
The NHSTP has been demonstrated to
be invalid and it results in p-values that
have little correlation with actual probabil-
ities of null hypotheses. We also have seen
that when the null hypothesis specifies a
point, as opposed to a range, it is almost
certainly false regardless of the obtained p-
value. Thus, whether the null hypothesis
specifies a range or a point, the NHSTP
is invalid. Arguably, because of its invalid-
ity, the NHSPT should not be performed,
and so inferential cheating bypasses a pro-
cedure that should not be used anyway.
Thus, where is the harm in avoiding the
use of a procedure that is blatantly invalid
and only trivially correlated with what we
really need to know (the probabilities of
null hypotheses)?
Let me be clear about what I am
not saying. First, I am not disagreeing
with various prescriptions for avoiding
inferential cheating, particularly because
many of them would reduce descrip-
tive cheating too, and the latter is much
more important. Second, I am not argu-
ing that all inferential cheating is harm-
less; for example, harm can result when
one makes improper estimates of popu-
lation parameters based on poor inferen-
tial procedures even with accurate sample
statistics. Third, it is quite possible that
in attempting heroic measures to obtain
p < 0.05, descriptive statistics also might
be influenced, and this would be harmful
to psychology. Fourth, from a deontolog-
ical point of view, cheating is unethical
in its own right, even apart from specific
demonstrable consequences, and so the
present argument should not be taken as
a justification for any cheating whatsoever.
With the foregoing caveats in place,
my main point is as follows. Although
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descriptive cheating is harmful in specific
and demonstrable ways, this is not true
of the most common type of inferential
cheating, which results in the rejection
of null hypotheses in ways that deviate
from ostensible proper practice. Clearly
such inferential cheating is undesirable in
a general deontological sense, but it is dif-
ficult to enumerate specific consequential
harm to the field of psychology. That spe-
cific consequential harm from inferential
cheating is so difficult to enumerate per-
haps constitutes a further argument that
the NHSTP should not be required for
publication.
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